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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW-HABEAS CORPUS TO REVIEW
COMPLETED SENTENCE
The case of Smyth v. Holland' presents a result which while
legally justified by the facts in the record, appears to deprive the
prisoner of his day in court because the lower court issued a
writ of habeas corpus extending only to a sentence obviously
closed to inquiry, and which under existing precedent could not
possibly be of benefit to the petitioner.
Holland, the petitioner, had been convicted in two trials in
the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk: the first having
been on a count of armed robbery; the second for theft of an
automobile. He was also convicted in a third trial by the Cor-
poration Court of the City of Danville, for the theft of a watch.
The first two convictions resulted in cumulative sentences of 26
years; the third, six years. All three trials took place within the
relatively short span of two months.
After having completed the sentence for the first two con-
victions, and while serving the six year sentence fixed by the
Danville court, petition for habeas corpus ad subjiciendum was
filed in the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, Part II.
The petitioner alleged that all three judgments were void for
lack of due process of law (with specific averments set forth)
and further alleged that the Corporation Court of the City of
Danville was without jurisdiction in regard to the third convic-
tion, for theft.
A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Hustings Court
upon only that portion of the petition alleging that the trial of
petitioner in the Norfolk court for armed robbery was void, and
subsequently judgment was entered finding the 25 year sentence
void. The time served under the void sentence was to be cred-
ited as served upon the other sentences, and being greater, the
court ordered the petitioner released.
On writ of error before the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, it was held, in accordance with the contentions of re-
1199 Va. 92, 97 SE.2d 745 (1957).
spondent, that the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond,
Part II, had no jurisdiction to credit time served on a prior com-
pleted sentence as served on other sentences under which Hol-
land was currently being held. Since the writ of habeas corpus
issued by the Hustings Court referred only to the validity of the
detention under one of the sentences imposed by the Norfolk
court, the court properly held that the void sentence was not the
basis of Holland's present detention, hence could not be the basis
for a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the lower court
was reversed and the writ dismissed.
In the opinion are mentioned two cases, Stonebreaker v.
Smyth2 and Fitzgerald v. Smytb,3 which recognized the power of
the judge in a habeas corpus proceeding to allow time served
under an invalid sentence, by which petitioners were currently
being detained, to be credited against time yet to be served under
another valid sentence. At the time when the Supreme Court
of Appeals found three sentences against Stonebreaker void, there
were other indictments pending against him in the same lower
court. Custody was transferred to the lower court with direc-
tions that should he be "tried and convicted on any one or more
of the three indictments pending against him, then he should re-
ceive proper credit for time served under any one of the three
indictments . .. " 4
Fitzgerald, too, was distinguished from the instant case on the
basis of presently pending indictments in the same lower courts.
There the Supreme Court suggested that "the trial court will
doubtless take into consideration the fact that the petitioner has,
according to the record, been in custody continuously since
August 12, 1944, a period of more than eight years; under con-
victions we hold to be nullities." 1
On the basis of these cases, it is apparent that Virginia rec-
ognizes the rule that habeas corpus may be successfully applied
to gain release of a prisoner where he will be returned to the
custody of the same lower court for application of time served
on void sentences to actions presently pending. As related to the
2187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).
3 194 Va. 681, 74 SZE.2d 810 (1953).
4 Stonebreaker v. Smyth, supra at 264.
5 Fitzgerald v. Smyth, supra at 691.
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instant case, such crediting is disallowed on the strict rule that
habeas corpus may only issue to determine the validity of deten-
tion under present sentence. It would therefore appear that the
lower court has in the instant case precluded the petitioner's suc-
cessful use of habeas corpus by restricting the writ issued to the
first sentence alleged to be void in the petition, and by failing to
consider the remainder.
S. J. B.
CRIMINAL LAW-LIMITATIONS ON USE OF
HABEAS CORPUS IN REGARD TO ALLOWANCE
OF CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED UNDER
PRIOR CONVICTIONS
The impact of the Holland' decision on the substantive
rights of prisoners who have been sentenced under void convic-
tions has been brought into sharper focus by Smyth v. Midgett.2
Once again the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond,
Part II, had ruled in favor of a petitioner on a writ of habeas
corpus with respect to a prior sentence, and once again the
Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the judgment of the
lower court on this point.
In the Midgett case petitioner had been convicted on six
charges of grand larceny and two charges of housebreaking, re-
ceiving a two year sentence for each conviction. He had com-
pletely served three of the sentences for grand larceny and at
the time he petitioned for habeas corpus was serving the fourth
sentence. His remaining unserved sentences included the two
remaining grand larceny convictions and the two housebreaking
convictions, plus three subsequently incurred escape convictions
of one year each.
Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus challenged the validity, on
constitutional grounds, of the eight original convictions for grand
larceny and housebreaking. The Hustings Court ruled in favor
of petitioner, finding all eight convictions void and further or-
'See Smyth v. Holland, 199 Va. 92 (1957) and comment therein supra,
p. 428.
2 199 Va. 727 (1958).
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